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There are concerns that regional inequality in India has increased after the economic 
reforms of 1991. This concern is supported by various statistical analyses. In this paper, 
we argue that the conclusions are sensitive to what measures of attainment are used. In 
particular, human development indices do not show the same increase in regional 
inequality. Furthermore, looking at consumption and credit indicators for regions 
disaggregated below the state level also suggests that inequality trends may not be as bad 
as suggested by State Domestic Product data, although the greater strength of the 
economies of the western and southern states emerges in our results. Finally, we briefly 
discuss policy implications within the context of India’s evolving federal polity.  
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1.Introduction 
There are concerns that regional inequality in India has increased after the economic 
reforms of 1991. This concern is supported by various statistical analyses. In this paper, 
we show that the conclusions are sensitive to what measures of attainment are used. In 
particular, human development indices do not show the same increase in regional 
inequality. Furthermore, looking at consumption and credit indicators for regions 
disaggregated below the state level also suggests that inequality trends may not be as bad 
as suggested by State Domestic Product data. Finally, we briefly discuss policy 
implications within the context of India’s evolving federal polity.  
 
In section 2, we briefly survey a sampling of previous work on growing inequality across 
the Indian states. We also summarize the trends in personal income distribution. In 
section 3, we consider trends in other indicators of economic achievement, but still at the 
state level. We find that the results are quite sensitive to what we are measuring. In 
section 4, we disaggregate below the state level, using regional data that allows a more 
fine-grained look at what is happening in different geographic regions of India. Section 5 
concludes with some discussion about possible policy implications, especially in the 




2. Inequality: The State of the Debate 
One can begin by noting that measures of personal income inequality tell us that very 
little has changed. This is the message of Table 1, which reports nationwide Gini 
coefficients and top and bottom quintile income shares. Of course, it may be that the 
figures are missing the rise in incomes of the top one or two percent of the country’s 
population, which may have benefited the most from liberalization
1, because of under-
coverage and under-reporting. Whether this speculation is true remains a matter for 
further investigation. 
 
Table 1: Personal Income Inequality Trends in India 
 




1960 0.327  8.4%  41.4% 
1980 0.322  8.5%  40.9% 
2000 0.327  8.7%  41.8% 
 
Source: Bhalla (2002), Table 3.1 
                                                 
1 For example, the Chief Minister of Punjab (a high income state) made the following remarks in his speech 
during the September 2001 meeting of the National Development Council: “In my view, most of the gains 
of development have been cornered by 10% of the population in the organized sector, while 90% of the 
population in the unorganized sector has only marginally benefited.” (Full text available at 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/pl49ndcf.htm) The substantial decline in poverty headcounts, however, is 
not consistent with this view. 
  2 
A statewise breakdown of Gini coefficients, including a division between rural and urban 
households, gives a similar picture of no strong increase in household inequality. The 14 
major states in Table 2 are listed in order of per capita SDP in 1981-82, from poorest to 
richest – we adopt this convention throughout the paper. Note that half the states show 
some (mostly small) increase in urban inequality (figures in italics) over the period 1993-
94 to 1999-2000, but none of the states display any increase in consumption inequality in 
rural households over the same period.  These conclusions are somewhat consistent with 
those of Deaton and Drèze (2002), although – based on adjustments to the 1999-2000 





Table 2: Gini Ratios for Per Capita Consumption Expenditure 
 
  1993-1994 1993-1994 1999-2000 1999-2000 
  Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Bihar 0.221  0.309  0.208  0.318 
Rajasthan  0.260 0.290 0.209 0.281 
Uttar Pradesh  0.278  0.324  0.245  0.327 
Orissa  0.243 0.304 0.242 0.292 
Madhya  Pradesh  0.278 0.326 0.241 0.312 
Andhra  Pradesh  0.257 0.321 0.238 0.310 
Tamil Nadu  0.308  0.344  0.279  0.398 
Kerala  0.290 0.340 0.270 0.320 
Karnataka 0.269  0.315  0.241  0.321 
West  Bengal  0.250 0.335 0.224 0.328 
Gujarat 0.236  0.285  0.233  0.288 
Haryana 0.300  0.280  0.240  0.285 
Maharashtra  0.301 0.350 0.258 0.345 
Punjab 0.264  0.276  0.238  0.290 
 
Source: Planning Commission, National Human Development Report, 2001, Table 2.3. 
 
 
Table 2 tells us only about inequality within rural and urban households for each state. It 
contains no information about inequality across states. This is where most studies have 
focused. In doing so, those studies essentially treat all households within a state as equal, 
since statewide averages are used. All the recent studies in this vein have raised concerns 
of growing inequality across India’s states. Table 3 summarizes a small subset of the 
numerous studies that have been undertaken. 
                                                 
2 Deaton and Drèze (2002) also use disaggregated data to provide evidence of a growth in rural-urban 
inequality within states. The aggregate data in Table 2 do not, of course, permit such inferences to be made. 
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We further discuss three of these studies here. Rao, Shand and Kalirajan (1999), 
examining the period 1965-95, found that SDPs for the 14 major states (excluding Goa 
and all the special category states) were diverging (using standard growth regressions for 
conditional convergence), even when one controlled for differences in initial conditions. 
They emphasized the role of private investment flows in explaining this pattern of 
regional inequality. Ahluwalia (2002) similarly found private investment flows to be a 
significant factor in explaining cross-sectional variation in states’ growth rates. While he 
did not examine divergence through regression analysis, his calculations of population-
weighted Gini coefficients for the 14 major states showed a substantial increase, from 
0.175 in 1991-92 to 0.233 in 1998-99.  
 
 
Table 3: Convergence Studies for India’s States 
 
Study Period  No.  of 
States 
Main Results 
Cashin and Sahay 
(1996) 
1961-91  20  Slow absolute and conditional convergence. 




1970-94  17  Absolute divergence, conditional convergence. 
Share of agriculture, infrastructure, political and 
institutional factors (state fixed effects) matter. 
Rao, Shand and 
Kalirajan (RSK, 1999) 
1965-95  14  Absolute and conditional divergence, faster in 
early 90s. Private investment matters. 
Aiyar (2001)  1971-96  19  Conditional convergence; infrastructure, private 
investment and nonmeasured institutional 
factors matter. 
Ahluwalia (2002)  1981-99  14  Gini coefficient of per capita SDP (weighted by 
population) increased from late 1980s, through 
1990s. Convergence not allowed for, but private 
investment matters for growth. 
Singh and Srinivasan 
(2002) 
1991-99  14  No clear evidence of conditional convergence or 
divergence. Financial/investment variables 
(credit, credit-deposit ratios, FDI) matter for 
growth. 
Sachs, Bajpai and 
Ramiah (2002) 
1980-98  14  Absolute divergence for all states (and for rich 
group but not poor group) for 1990-98; 
qualitative discussion of possible conditioning 
factors (social and geographic variables). 
 
 
Singh and Srinivasan (2002), looking at the period 1990-91 to 1998-99, however, found 
that the evidence does not permit one to reach very definite conclusions on convergence 
or divergence across the (14 major) states. As in other studies, they found that private 
investment (measured by per capita bank credit) matters for growth. They also found that 
  4credit-deposit ratios and FDI approvals per capita have positive impacts on growth.
3 
Finally, they observe that credit-deposit ratios (a proxy for the internal movement of 
capital) have both become more varied across states, and more closely correlated with 
SDP per capita. These findings are suggestive of capital (foreign and domestic) 




Should one worry about increasing inequality of SDPs? Increasing inequality across 
regions is certainly a concern if it sharpens political tensions, especially in a diverse 
federal polity such as India’s. On the other hand, the evidence for increasing inequality of 
per capita SDP across states may have limited consequences. First, there is no clear 
statistical evidence of long run divergence. Second, the statistical analyses all use SDP as 
the outcome measure. As all the studies note, this has its problems. It ignores remittances, 
and these may have significant impacts on incomes. In some cases, such as remittances 
from Punjabi emigrants abroad, these flows may go to richer states. On the other hand, 
there are substantial remittances internally, such as from Bihari migrant agricultural 
laborers in Punjab back to their home state. In the latter case, accounting for remittances 
would reduce inequalities. In the next section, we examine some alternative outcome 




3. Alternative Outcome Measures 
One possibility for measuring the well being of individuals across different states is to 
look at consumption measures. These are available from the Planning Commission’s 
National Human Development Report (NHDR, Planning Commission of India, 2002, 
Table 2.2), and we use this data to perform some regressions to test for absolute 
convergence in per capita consumption expenditures. These results are presented in Table 
4. The dependent variable is the difference in the natural logarithm of per capita 
consumption expenditure between 1999-2000 and the base year (hence the growth rate 
over the entire period) and the independent variable is per capita consumption 
expenditure in the base year. The two base years are 1983 and 1993-94. Interestingly, the 
regressions suggest absolute divergence in both periods, but the evidence is weak for the 
later period (not quite significant at the 10% level, using a two-sided test – which does 
not presume either convergence or divergence), which covers the bulk of the post-reform 
era. 
 
The conclusion from the statistical analysis in Table 4 is somewhat different from that of 
Deaton and Drèze (2002). Referring to the period 1993-94 to 1999-2000, they argue that 
there is “strong evidence of ‘divergence’ in per capita consumption across states” (pp. 
3739-40). The differences in our analysis are as follows. First, we exclude Delhi and 
three special category states included in their study. Second, they use a different measure 
                                                 
3 In contrast, consistent with the finding of Ahluwalia (2002), the broad infrastructure index constructed by 
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), which includes 13 variables measuring aspects of 
physical, social and financial infrastructure, has no significant impact on growth. 
4 Policy also matters, as the poor record of Punjab, a rich state, in attracting FDI bears out. 
  5of average per capita expenditure, the geometric mean. Neither of these is likely to lead 
to major differences in results. Most importantly, they do not perform a statistical test to 
examine the significance of the positive relationship between base year values and 
growth rates
5. Our analysis is also performed with 1983 as the base year, suggesting that 
the 1990s may have been better than the 1980s in terms of trends in consumption 
inequality, in the sense that the rate of increase may have diminished. An important 
























Notes:   Dependent variable is growth of per capita consumption expenditure from base year to 1999-2000 




We next look at broader outcome measures, which reflect how the states are doing 
relatively, in terms of standards of living.
6 In particular, the Planning Commission now 
publishes a National Human Development Report (NHDR, Planning Commission of 
India, 2002), which looks at eight different dimensions of development performance: per 
capita expenditure, headcount poverty rate, literacy rate, a formal education enrollment 
index, infant mortality rate, life expectancy, access to safe water and access to housing 
constructed with relatively permanent materials. Calculations by Singh and Srinivasan 
(2002) suggest that the Human Development Index (HDI) constructed in the NHDR does 
not show any increase in across-state variation (again, this is for the 14 major states), as 
measured by the unweighted standard deviation. Since the average HDI has risen in the 
1990s, the coefficient of variation has fallen (Table 5). These numbers are therefore quite 
consistent with the conclusion that inter-state disparities in well-being have not worsened 





                                                 
5 See Deaton and Drèze (2002), Figure 2, p. 3735. 
6 We are grateful to Devesh Kapur for initially pointing us in the direction of the following discussion.  The 
work of Deaton and Drèze (2002) and Drèze and Sen (2002) also argues forcefully for this more general 
perspective on measuring development. 
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Table 5: State Level Human Development Indices 
 
 
State  1981 1981 1991 1991 2001 2001 
   Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 
Andhra Pradesh  0.298 9 0.377 9 0.416  10 
Bihar  0.237 14 0.308 14 0.367 14 
Gujarat  0.360 4 0.431 6 0.479 6 
Haryana  0.360 5 0.443 5 0.509 5 
Karnataka  0.346 6 0.412 7 0.478 7 
Kerala  0.500 1 0.591 1 0.638 1 
Madhya Pradesh  0.245 13 0.328 12 0.394 12 
Maharashtra  0.363 3 0.452 4 0.523 4 
Orissa  0.267 10 0.345 11 0.404 11 
Punjab  0.411 2 0.475 2 0.537 2 
Rajasthan  0.256 11 0.347 10 0.424  9 
Tamil Nadu  0.343 7 0.466 3 0.531 3 
Uttar Pradesh  0.255 12 0.314 13 0.388 13 
West Bengal  0.305 8 0.404 8 0.472 8 
All India  0.302  0.381  0.472  
        
Unweighted average  0.325  0.407  0.469  
Standard deviation  0.071  0.075  0.072  
Coefficient of variation  0.219  0.185  0.155  
 
 
Source: Planning Commission (2002) and Singh and Srinivasan (2002). 
 
 
We can extend the analysis of Singh and Srinivasan (2002) by estimating convergence-
style regressions. Since the HDI is already compressed by being constrained to lie 
between zero and one, we do not use logarithms, instead regressing the change in the 
HDI on the base year. These results are presented in Table 6. In addition to testing for 
absolute convergence, we also include credit per capita in a separate regression, to test for 
conditional convergence – this was one of the investment variables that Singh and 
Srinivasan found to be significant in explaining the growth of per capita SDP in the 
1990s. However, such variables turn out to be insignificant in affecting improvements in 
the HDI. This result is not surprising, but it could have gone the other way, and would 
have been a greater cause for concern in that case. To summarize, when we look at a 
broad measure of well-being, there is no evidence of the absolute divergence that shows 
up in output and consumption measures.
7
                                                 
7 One important caveat we should add is that the HDI includes mostly stock measures. We would expect 
these to be changing more slowly, and therefore our empirical investigation may be missing longer run 
problems of divergence. Furthermore, as discussed in detail in Deaton and Drèze (2002), measure of 
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Credit per capita, 
1990-91    0.053 
(0.048) 
 
Notes:   Dependent variable is change in HDI from 1991 to 2001. 




4. Inequality Below the State Level 
A final aspect of regional inequality involves going to the sub state level.
8 In this case, 
one has no output data, so the problem of SDP as a measure of economic outcomes is 
moot. Recently, Bhandari and Khare (BK, 2002) have used data available at the level of 
regions as defined by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). The NSSO 
divides the Indian states into 78 homogenous agro-economic regions that are groups of 
contiguous districts, demarcated on the basis of agro-climatic homogeneity. Each region 
is contained within a state or union territory. Together these regions cover all of India. 
For each region, BK construct an economic performance index based on five variables: 
petrol sales, diesel sales, bank credit, bank deposits and cereal production. They compare 
the years 1991-92 and 1998-99, and report how each region did over this period, in terms 
of share of the overall economy.  
 
The BK calculations reveal several interesting patterns. First, a clear West-East divide 
emerges, with the West increasing its economic share. Second, there is no obvious North-
South or coastal-inland divide. Third, most of the areas that do the best are centered on 
urban areas, which appear to be acting as growth poles. Fourth, many of the areas that lag 
are rain-fed agricultural regions, consistent with the general consensus that agriculture 
has been bypassed by the reform program to date.
9 Fifth, Punjab, Haryana and Kerala do 
relatively well in this analysis (better than when per capita SDP is used as a measure of 
performance), consistent with our earlier discussion of international remittances. Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                 
development or well-being that are components of the HDI may be changing in very different ways, while 
other measures (e.g., gender ratios) may not be included at all in such indices. 
8 Deaton and Drèze (2002) also emphasize the importance of analyzing well-being at a more localized level 
than that of the state, and provide some examples. Here we go further and perform a statistical analysis. 
9 To the extent that rural India and poorer regions are lagging in relative shares of the economy, this picture 
is consistent with increasing regional inequality of economic outcomes. However, this is not a direct 
inference from the BK calculations, since they are given in terms of changing relative shares, not absolute 
performance.  
  8while some states are doing consistently well, in terms of all regions within the state 
increasing their relative share (e.g., Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab and Haryana), there are 
other states with marked internal disparities in regional performance (e.g., Andhra 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra). Thus, going down to the regional level 
provides a considerably more nuanced picture of the regional patterns of economic 
change in the post-reform period.  
 
Here we extend the BK analysis by again looking at convergence-style regressions, but 
now for the regional data. Rather than construct an index, we examine the five variables 
individually. This results in some observations with missing data being eliminated from 
the regressions, but we are still left with 59 observations, which gives a considerably 
more disaggregated and complete picture than does state-level analysis. The results are 
reported in Table 7 (absolute convergence) and Table 8 (conditional convergence).  
 
In Table 7, we see that only diesel consumption and credit show evidence of absolute 
divergence. This is consistent with a story in which productive economic activity is 
becoming more unequal across regions, but final consumption is not subject to such 
effects to the same degree. This is broadly consistent with the picture at the state level. 
 
 
































   
Deposits 1991     0.02 
(0.04) 
  




1991       0.02 
(0.08) 
 
Notes:   All variables are natural logarithms and in per capita terms. 
  Dependent variable is change in the log of the per capita variable between later and base years. 
  Standard errors in parentheses; *,**,*** correspond to 10%,5%,1% significant level, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 8, we see that, once conditioning variables are included in the regressions, diesel 
consumption still shows some evidence of divergence, but the statistical significance is 
  9weaker. Petrol consumption shows evidence of conditional convergence, and the other 
variables have coefficients that do not permit an inference in either direction. The 
importance of the conditioning variables varies across the regressions, and the overall 
explanatory power of the regressions is not high (R
2’s ranging from 0.15 to 0.34), but the 
results again are broadly consistent with those of Table 7 and state level regressions.  
 
 
















































































Notes:   All variables are natural logarithms and in per capita terms. 
  Dependent variable is change in the log of the per capita variable between later and base years. 
  Standard errors in parentheses; *,**,*** correspond to 10%,5%,1% significant level, respectively. 
 
 
Finally, we include dummies for the different ‘zones’ of India – we use this term since 
we have used ‘regions’ for the smaller, sub state geographic units. Using the East and 
Northeast combined as the base zone
10, we include zonal dummies for the North, South, 
and West of the country. The results are presented in Tables 9 and 10. The results for 
convergence are broadly similar to the previous two tables, with some minor differences. 
The new result that emerges is the significance of the zonal dummies, particularly for the 
South and West. Since these dummies are positive and significant for most of the five 
measures of economic activity (cereal production in the West being the main exception), 
they suggest that at this level of aggregation there are some possible concerns, which 
deserve further investigation with disaggregated data. The difference across zones in 
these measures of economic activity is something that is not easily captured through 
regressions using state-level data, since the degrees of freedom are too few. However, the 
finding that the South and West of India have been doing better is consistent with earlier 
                                                 
10 Since many of the missing observations are in the Northeast, we combine it with the Eastern sone. 
  10analyses that have used SDP data. We turn to policy implications our results and 












































   
Deposits 1991     -0.02 
(0.03) 
  



















































Notes:   All variables are natural logarithms and in per capita terms. 
  Dependent variable is change in the log of the per capita variable between later and base years. 
  Standard errors in parentheses; *,**,*** correspond to 10%,5%,1% significant level, respectively. 
 





























































































































Notes:   All variables are natural logarithms and in per capita terms. 
  Dependent variable is change in the log of the per capita variable between later and base years. 
  Standard errors in parentheses; *,**,*** correspond to 10%,5%,1% significant level, respectively. 
 
 
   
5. Conclusion 
We conclude by relating our analysis to India’s federal polity and its attempts at 
economic reform. A federal system involves explicit and implicit balancing of the 
interests of its constituent units. Perceptions of fairness among the constituents units can 
matter as well as the objective material gains from being part of the larger nation.
11 India 
has faced these issues since independence (and earlier), and central policies have always 
incorporated inter-regional and inter-state considerations, in matters such as directing 
investment, controlling prices and restricting the movements of certain goods. The 
loosening of central controls that has been an important part of the reform package has 
heightened two related fears: first, that the poor would be left behind; second, that some 
constituent political units of the nation would be left behind.  
 
                                                 
11 Of course, non-economic concerns such as language, culture and other aspects of identity are also 
extremely important, particularly in a nation as heterogeneous as India. 
  12The evidence surveyed and presented in this paper suggests that the second of these fears 
may have been over emphasized. There are some indications of increases in regional 
inequality, but they are neither uniform nor overly dramatic. To some extent, increases in 
regional inequality are driven by factors that are necessary for accelerated growth – in 
particular, the more efficient allocation of private capital, foreign as well as domestic. 
The data also suggest (Table 5) that state government policies can make a difference: 
governments in poorer states such as Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have made strides in 
improving, on average, the relative standard of living of their constituents. Hence, 
liberalization does not necessarily leave certain states behind. 
 
At the sub state level, some states may be seeing greater disparities emerging within their 
boundaries. One might guess that intra-state labor mobility is greater than across states, 
so that this problem may be more self-correcting than inter-state disparities. On the other 
hand, the problem may be mobility across rural and urban areas, and across social 
boundaries. The evidence is consistent with the view that the reforms have had a greater 
positive impact in urban areas, leaving rural areas to await meaningful agricultural reform 
(removing distortions on pricing and distribution, and improving infrastructure). Intra-
state disparities also put the focus on effective state government policies, including 
building the fiscal and institutional capacity of nascent local governments to deliver local 
public goods and services. 
 
The central government also may draw some policy lessons from the empirical evidence 
on regional inequality. Clearly, intergovernmental transfers cannot remove such 
inequalities. However, they can be designed to more clearly meet classic Musgravian 
horizontal equity objectives, without reducing incentives for fiscal discipline, than is the 
case now. In particular, streamlining the center-state transfer system can only help isolate 
any inter-state disparities that are likely to cause political tensions, and make clear the 
redistributive effort that is politically necessary. In this respect, it is important to 
recognize that implicit financial transfers by the central government, through its control 
of the financial system, have been important, and have often favored higher income states 
(Rao, Shand and Kalirajan, 1999).
12 Reducing the pervasive government presence in the 
financial sector can be an important complement to making the intergovernmental 
transfer system at all levels (center-state, state-local and center-local) more efficient, if 
inter-regional inequalities are to be clearly addressed by government policy. 
 
Our conclusion is that India’s record with respect to inequality in the post-reform period 
is not too bad, with respect to potential problems of growing regional disparities. 
Economic reform has actually done better than many commentators had expected. 
Clearly there are policy improvements that can help further in managing inequalities, but 




                                                 
12 Tax reform is another area that has distributive implications across the states: the current tax system 
encourages tax exportation by richer states (Rao and Singh, 1998). 
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